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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WENDALYN ENCE, nka 
WENDALYN SMITH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ENCE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 950829-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
COMES NOW the Appellee to the above-captioned matter 
(hereinafter "Husband"), by and through counsel, and submits the 
following as his brief of Appellee herein: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3 (2) (h) , and the provisions of Rules 
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce and the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof, of the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah. In 
particular, Wife has appealed those provisions which awarded 
Husband $1,700 per month alimony from wife; including whether the 
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trial court's findings supported the award, whether the trial court 
erred with regard to entering specific detailed findings regarding 
the amount and duration of the alimony award, and whether the trial 
court erred in finding that Husband contributed significantly and 
substantially to Wife's medical school career. Wife has further 
appealed the trial court's property and alimony award, specifically 
regarding what factors the court should consider in deciding 
whether or not to make a compensation adjustment. 
Husband appeals the trial court's alimony award. 
Specifically, Husband appeals the provisions regarding the amount 
thereof, and whether the court's determination of that amount 
properly considered Husband's needs, Wife's ability to pay, and 
equalization of the parties' income. 
In addition, Husband has requested that this court award 
Husband attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Appellant's issues: 
Point I: Was the trial court's alimony award of $1,7 00 per 
month for twenty-one (21) years an abuse of discretion? 
A. Are the trial court's Findings of Fact insufficient 
to support its alimony award? 
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B. Did the court err in failing to enter specific 
detailed Findings of Fact showing how it arrived at the amount and 
duration of the alimony award? 
C. Did the trial court err in finding that Husband 
contributed significantly and substantially to his wife's 
attendance at medical school? 
Point II: What factors should the trial court consider when 
deciding whether or not to make a compensation adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony? 
II. Appellee's Issues: 
A. Did the trial court err in awarding Husband alimony in 
the amount of $1,700 per month, considering Husband's needs, Wife's 
ability to pay, and equalization of the parties' income? 
B. Is Husband entitled to attorney fees herein? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of 
discretion standard. "Trial courts have considerable discretion to 
adjust divorcing parties' financial and property interests." 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P. 2d 121, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . This court has stated that " [a]bsent a showing of clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an 
alimony or property award." Throckmorton, at 123, citing Gardner 
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v, Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735 
P.2d 395, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There is no case law authority, nor statutory authority 
believed by Husband to be wholly dispositive or wholly 
determinative of the issues raised on appeal; however, Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1996) is substantially relevant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Wendalyn Ence, now known as Wendalyn Smith 
(hereinafter referred to as "Wife") filed a Complaint for divorce 
on January 5, 1995. Husband filed an Answer on February 21, 
1995. 
This divorce action was tried before the Second District Court 
in and for Weber County, State of Utah, on the 8th day of 
September, 1995, the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, presiding. 
Among other things, the judge entered orders regarding 
alimony. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce from which the parties appeal were signed and entered by 
the court on November 14, 1995. Said Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto, 
designated as Appendix "A" and "B," respectively. 
Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on December 12, 1995. Husband 
filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on December 20, 1995. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on November 25, 1974, in Page, 
Arizona. (Tr. at 17) . Husband was thirty-five and Wife was twenty-
one at the time of marriage. (Tr. at 133). The parties have two 
adult children, to-wit: Tyson, born October 20, 1976, and Kelly, 
born November 14, 1977. (Tr. at 18, 21, 138). 
Throughout the parties marriage, Husband worked full-time as 
a heavy equipment operator, and has worked in that field since 
1956. (Tr. at 21, 134). When the parties married, Wife worked as 
a secretary at a hospital business office. (Tr. at 20). In 1975, 
Wife worked as a secretary at the Ram Valley Consolidated School 
District. (Tr. at 21). During part of the time when the parties' 
children were young, Wife was primarily a primary caregiver and 
worked part time at home as a typist for the local airport. (Tr. 
at 21). 
In January, 1981, Wife entered college at Glendale Community 
College. (Tr. at 22) . Wife transferred to Grand Canyon University 
in 1983. (Tr. at 22). Wife obtained her undergraduate degree in 
May, 1985. (Tr. at 23, 139). Wife worked part time during her 
first semester of college. (Tr. at 22) . However, after that time, 
Wife did not work outside the home while attending college. (Tr. 
at 23-25) . Throughout her four years of undergraduate education, 
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Wife borrowed approximately $6,000.00 for tuition and received some 
scholarships. (Tr. at 25). 
For approximately two years after Wife obtained her 
undergraduate degree, Wife worked as an estimator for an industrial 
truss company and later as a substitute teacher. (Tr. at 27) . 
Wife earned approximately $15,000 per year during this time. (Tr. 
at 28) . 
Wife was accepted to medical school in 1987. (Tr. at 29). 
Wife and the minor children moved from Phoenix to Tucson, Arizona 
in order for the Wife to attend medical school at the University of 
Arizona in Tucson. (Tr. at 30). The parties purchased a home in 
Tucson. (Tr. at 29) . 
During Wife's third and fourth years of medical school, Wife 
"hired" a first year medical student to serve as a nanny on 
weekdays while Wife was spending increased amounts of time at the 
hospital and at school. (Tr. at 82). This was accomplished by 
trading a room in the Tucson home for services. (Tr. at 82) . Wife 
borrowed approximately $49,000 in student loans to finance her 
medical school education. (Tr. at 30, 32). Wife's tuition, books 
and fees for medical school amounted to $23,000. (Tr. at 30, 32) . 
Wife therefore contributed approximately $6,500 per year out of her 
student loans toward family expenses during the four years she 
attended medical school. (Tr. at 32). While Wife was in medical 
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school, the parties spent their savings of approximately $10,000 to 
$12,000. (Tr. at 116, 130) . The remaining household expenses were 
met by Husband's earnings. 
Wife graduated from medical school in May, 1991. (Tr. at 40) . 
Wife moved to Ogden, Utah in June 1991 in order to complete her 
internship and residency requirements at McKay Dee Hospital, and 
the family, including Husband, moved in order to accommodate Wife's 
career. (Tr. at 40) . Wife completed her internship and residency 
in June 1994. (Tr. at 40). 
Throughout the parties' marriage Husband worked as a heavy 
equipment operator. (Tr. at 134) . Husband has no college training 
and his educational background consists of high school. (Tr. at 
133). Husband had been a heavy equipment operator since 1956. 
(Tr. at 134) . Husband had been a union member since approximately 
1960. (Tr. at 135) . Husband earned approximately $18.52 per hour 
when Wife was in medical school. (Tr. at 143). However, the 
company for which Husband worked was purchased by another company 
while Wife was in medical school, and Husband's pay was reduced to 
$14.50 per hour. (Tr. at 145). Husband was eventually given a 
raise to $15.00 per hour. (Tr. at 147). 
Husband was required to live apart from Wife and the parties' 
children while Wife was in medical school in order to continue 
working at a job which provided the income needed to support the 
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family. (Tr. at 140-141). Husband lived in a 1965 camper trailer 
in his parent's yard during the work week. (Tr. at 141) . Husband 
drove to Tucson every weekend to be with the family. (Tr. at 142) . 
Husband worked at least eight hours per day and often worked 
overtime five days per week while Wife was in medical school. (Tr. 
at 144). Husband logged an average of 50,000 miles driven in 
employment every year while Wife was in medical school. (Tr. at 
143-44) . Husband attempted to find a job in Tucson in order to be 
nearer the family, but was unable to find a suitable job. (Tr. at 
145). Husband could not afford to lose his job, even though his 
pay decreased while Wife was in medical school, because he provided 
the sole support for the family. (Tr. at 145) . 
When the parties eventually moved to Ogden, Utah for Wife's 
residency, Husband looked for employment. (Tr. 148). Because Utah 
is not a union state, Husband found that $10.00 per hour was the 
highest wage he could find. (Tr. at 149) . Husband eventually found 
employment, but his employer did not pay him. (Tr. at 149-150). 
Husband then stayed home with the parties' children, pursuant to an 
agreement with Wife, caring for the home and children. (Tr. 151) . 
Finally, after the parties separated, Husband looked for work 
and was able to find work in St. George, Utah. (Tr. at 172-173). 
Husband attempted to return to his employment in Arizona at the 
rate of $15.00 per hour, but the company was not hiring and Husband 
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was unable to find any other union work in Arizona. (Tr. at 173) . 
Husband therefore earned $12.00 per hour at the time of trial as a 
heavy equipment operator for Delray Jackson Construction in St. 
George, Utah. (Tr. at 173-73) . 
Wife completed her residency and earned over $100,000 in 1994, 
the last full year of the parties' marriage. (Tr. at 48) . At the 
time of trial, September 1995, Wife was earning $120,000 per year. 
(Tr. at 76) . Wife has a written employment contract which expires 
in August 1997. (Tr. at 75). Under her employment contract, the 
hospital pays all of Wife's overhead, money for continuing 
education, and medical malpractice insurance, and repays her 
student loans, in addition to the $120,000 per year. (Tr. at 77). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not err in awarding alimony to Husband. 
First, the trial court entered sufficient findings upon which the 
award was based. The trial court specifically set forth findings 
regarding Husband's need, Wife's ability to pay, Husband's ability 
to provide sufficient income for himself, and the length of the 
marriage. Second, the trial court based the award on the parties' 
specific situation, as presented in the record. Both statutory and 
case law support Husband's alimony award in that Husband 
substantially contributed to Wife's ability to obtain her current 
career level, and based upon the parties' incomes. 
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Further, this court should not attempt to alter settled law to 
require specific guidelines for establishing compensation alimony 
as suggested by Wife. Current Utah law, as well as the law in 
other jurisdictions, emphasize the need for equitable 
determinations in alimony cases, in which the trial court is 
allowed broad discretion and is able to view the particular 
circumstances of the individual cases in their totality. 
However, the trial court did err in failing to equalize the 
parties' income. The parties in this matter were married for 
twenty-one years, during which Husband provided nearly the sole 
monetary support for the family while Wife was able to attend 
college, medical school, and residency, eventually becoming a 
medical doctor. Just as Wife completed her residency and was 
finally able to utilize her degree to earn a substantial income, 
Wife filed this divorce action. Husband has supported Wife for 
twenty-one years, helped raise two children to adulthood, has a 
limited education and few job skills, and is fifteen years older 
then Wife. Additionally, Wife has sufficient income in excess of 
expenses to accommodate an equalization of income. Thus, this is 
a proper case for the court to equalize the parties' income levels 
through the alimony award. 
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Finally, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees 
and Husband should have been awarded the entire amount of $3,000, 
as requested. 
Thus, this court should affirm the lower court's decision in 
part and reverse the lower court's decision in part, as outlined 
above. Husband should get his fees in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO 
HUSBAND INASMUCH AS HUSBAND SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO 
THE PARTIES' TWENTY-ONE YEAR MARRIAGE. 
Wife has alleged in her brief that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its alimony award to Husband. Wife has claimed that 
the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the award, 
that the trial court did not enter specific findings as to how it 
arrived at the amount and duration of the award, and that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
Husband contributed significantly and substantially to Wife's 
medical school career. 
An alimony award is committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court and may not be disturbed absent a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). The trial court's findings of fact are only 
erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Schindler v. 
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Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . Further, even 
though appellate courts may weigh the evidence and substitute their 
judgment for that of the trial court, this is not done lightly nor 
merely because the appellate court's judgment may differ from that 
of the trial court's judgment. Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P. 2d 237, 
239 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Husband will show first that the trial court's findings of 
fact were sufficient; second, that the trial court entered specific 
findings supporting the alimony award; and third, that the record 
contains sufficient evidence to prove that Husband contributed to 
Wife's medical career. 
A. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Were 
Sufficient to Support the Alimony Award. 
The findings of fact in this matter were sufficiently detailed 
and comprehensive to support the award of alimony to Husband. Case 
law and statutory provisions have set forth the necessary 
requirements for establishing alimony in Utah divorces. 
"Utah courts have held that ' [a]n alimony award should, after 
a marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage.'" Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); 
see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts 
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v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Bell v. Bell. 
810 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"In light of this goal, the trial court must consider: Ml) 
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income; and 
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.'11 
Godfrey, at 589, quoting Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also Jones, 
700 P.2d at 1075, Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
These three factors, known as the Jones factors, have been 
incorporated into the Utah alimony statute. The statute also adds 
a fourth factor which trial courts must consider in fashioning an 
alimony award. The statute provides as follows: 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following 
factors in determining alimony; 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (a) (Supp. 1996) . 
"Failure to consider these factors in fashioning an alimony 
award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Godfrey, at 589, citing 
Bell, 810 P.2d at 492. 
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Wife has alleged that the trial court failed to consider these 
factors. However, the trial court, while not specifically 
categorizing its findings as Jones factors, considered the same, 
stating that: 
a. The parties' marriage is of long duration, having 
lasted approximately 21 years; and 
b. The parties' have jointly raised two children to 
maturity during this marriage; and 
c. Plaintiff is 41 years of age; and 
d. Defendant is 56 years of age; and 
i. The combined historical annual income of the family 
is approximately as follows: 1987, $51,000; 1988, 
$41,000; 1989, $36,000; 1990, $36,000; 1991, $30,000; 
1992, $34,000; 1993, $57,000; and 1994 $100,000; and 
j. The Plaintiff's gross income is currently $120,000 
per year and defendant's current gross income is $25,000 
per year; and 
k. Plaintiff's income, net of taxes, is $7,000.00 per 
month and defendant's income, net of taxes, is $1,600.00 
per month; and 
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q. The alimony ward in this case is based upon a 
reasonable standard of living for the defendant. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law #13). Accordingly, the 
court specifically noted Husband's financial condition and needs, 
explaining the prior joint income of the parties as well as 
Husband's current income. Husband's needs were noted in the 
provision which states that the alimony award was based on a 
reasonable standard of living. The court noted Husband's earning 
capacity specifically, explaining the prior earnings of the parties 
(and noting that prior to 1993 the great majority of all of the 
income of the parties throughout the lengthy marriage was produced 
by Husband), and citing Husband's current income. Finally, the 
court noted Wife's ability to pay by explaining Wife's current 
income, less taxes, and comparing the same to Husband's current 
income (which shows that Wife earns $5,400.00 more per month than 
Husband after taxes). 
Within her brief, Wife has alleged that Husband showed no need 
for alimony through testimony or exhibits and that therefore 
Husband's need does not exist. In fact, Wife specifically mentions 
that "the only evidence as to [Husband's] monthly expenses is his 
testimony that his rent is $500.00 per month (Tr. at 161), and he 
was ordered to pay one-half of the approximately $635.00 per month 
house payment until the house is sold. (Tr. at 19, Findings of Fact 
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#5; R. at 97) . However, Wife fails to mention that inherent within 
this testimony lies Husband's need for alimony. Husband's $500.00 
per month rent is for a 25 foot long camper trailer in which he 
resides in a relative's back yard in St. George. (Tr. 161) . Thus, 
not only does Husband not have the money on his own to purchase a 
home, but Husband has insufficient monetary support, on his own, to 
rent an apartment. Further, Wife mentions in her brief that 
Husband "further testified that if he lived in an apartment he 
would have to come up with first and last months rent, implying he 
doesn't have the money; however, he was given and used $1,000 to go 
to golf school." (Appellant's Brief at 18). Wife again fails to 
set forth the full context of Husband's testimony, in which Husband 
testified that, although Husband did in fact accept a golf school 
vacation near the end of 1994 and/or beginning of 1995, the same 
was a gift from the parties' son. (Tr. 161-162). 
Further, Wife alleges in her brief that the court did not 
enter sufficient findings regarding Husband's earning capacity, 
specifically stating that "[t]here are no findings as to why 
[Husband] is earning less at the time of trial than he earned 
previously." (Appellant's Brief at 19). The trial court is not 
required, per statute or case law, to enter such a specific 
finding. However, the court based its findings on all of the 
evidence before it, and Husband testified during trial that he is 
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a heavy equipment operator (Tr. 134). Husband testified that his 
only employment skills are to operate heavy equipment or ride 
horses. (Tr. at 134). Husband testified that there isn't much 
employment available riding horses. (Tr. at 134). Husband also 
testified that he has no college training and his educational 
background consists of high school. (Tr. at 133). Husband had 
been a heavy equipment operator since 1956. (Tr. at 134) . Husband 
had been a union member since approximately 1960. (Tr. at 135) . 
Husband had earned approximately $18.52 per hour when Wife was in 
medical school. (Tr. at 143). However, the company for which 
Husband worked at the time was purchased and Husband's pay was 
reduced to $14.50 per hour. (Tr. at 145) . Husband was eventually 
given a raise to $15.00 per hour. (Tr. at 147) . When the parties 
eventually moved to Ogden, Utah for Wife's residency, Husband 
looked for employment. (Tr. 148). Because Utah is not a union 
state, Husband found that $10.00 per hour was the highest wage he 
could find. (Tr. at 149) . Husband eventually found employment, but 
his employer failed to pay him. (Tr. at 149-150). Husband then 
stayed home with the parties' children, pursuant to an agreement 
between the parties. (Tr. 151). Finally, after the parties 
separated Husband looked for work and was able to find work in St. 
George, Utah. (Tr. at 172-173). Husband attempted to return to 
his employment in Arizona at the rate of $15.00 per hour, but the 
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company was not hiring and Husband was unable to find any other 
union work in Arizona. (Tr. at 173) . Husband therefore earned 
$12.00 per hour as a heavy equipment operator for Delray Jackson 
Construction in St. George, Utah at time of trial. (Tr. at 173-
73) . Therefore, the trial court had ample testimony before it 
which explained Husband's decreased income. 
Further, Wife claims that the trial court made no underlying 
factual determination of Wife's ability to pay support. However, 
this argument is misplaced. Wife entered exhibits which set forth 
her monthly income and expenses, thereby providing the court with 
the underlying factual determination of her ability to pay support. 
Wife's exhibit number 17 was summarized by Husband's counsel in 
closing argument as follows: 
Her paycheck shows a net of $7,664.69. Her expenses are 
$4,104.00 a month. And that's her expenses on Exhibit 
17. Her current expenses, $4,104.00 a month. And that's 
allowing for things like buying herself a building lot in 
Willard of $734.00 a month. And that's allowing for 
things like $250.00 a month for clothing. That's 
continuing to carry insurance for adult children. That's 
putting an adult chid through college or university. 
That's $300.00 a month entertainment. Pet care of 
$200.00 a month. She has a $100.00 vacation allowance, 
$200.00 a month gift allowance, $75.00 a month for 
dentist. And she comes up with $4,104.00 in expenses 
against $7,664.00 a month net. She is $3,561.00 per 
month to the good while her husband of 21 years is still 
living in a camp trailer and can't muster first and last 
month's rent to get into even an apartment. 
(Tr. at 198-99) . 
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Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and met the 
findings of fact requirements as set forth by Utah case law and 
statute. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Setting 
Forth Its Findings of Fact Showing The Basis 
for the Alimony Award and Further Set Forth 
Sufficient Findings to Support the Finding 
That Husband Contributed To Wife's Medical 
School Career. 
The trial court entered specific Findings of Fact which 
provided a basis for the alimony award in this matter. Wife has 
claimed in her brief that the trial court failed to enter such 
findings. Wife's argument on this point consists of a recital of 
the evolution of Utah case law. 
Wife has set forth the following cases for the proposition 
that the recipient spouse had become economically disadvantaged 
during a long-term marriage: Tremayne v. Tremayne. 116 Utah 483 
(Utah 1949); Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991); Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985); Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988); and Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Wife has claimed that the common thread in all of the above 
cases was that the recipient spouse took herself out of the work 
force for a lengthy period during a long term marriage to be a 
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homemaker and/or for health reasons and thereby became economically 
disadvantaged in an absolute sense. (Appellant's Brief at 26). 
Wife's reading of the case law is skewed. The same cases may be 
seen to stand for the proposition that, when the marriage is of 
long duration, in which both parties sacrificed and worked toward 
the common good of the family, the spouse with smaller earning 
potential should be entitled to long-term (if not permanent) 
alimony. 
The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have 
consistently overruled temporary alimony decisions or small awards 
in cases of long-term marriages. Several of these cases are 
analogous to the facts in this matter. 
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
the wife was in her fifties, had spent most of her life providing 
services to her family with no monetary remuneration, and had 
minimal work experience. The Utah Court of Appeals found that she 
could not be expected to find a job immediately upon completing her 
schooling, and that her salary, when she did find employment, was 
unknown. Id. at 478. Thus, the court overruled a temporary 
alimony award. Id. at 479. 
The fact situation in Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) was as follows: the wife was a woman in her late 
fifties, who, while in reasonably good health, had never been 
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substantially employed and had not developed any employable skills. 
The court found that the trial court had therefore abused its 
discretion in terminating her alimony at age sixty-two. Id. at 
122. 
In Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), the wife filed a modification petition to increase 
alimony from $1.00 per year to $500.00 per month. The trial court 
awarded $396.00 per month, based upon its findings that wife was 
unable to produce sufficient income for herself due to her medical 
problems, and husband was able to provide support due to his annual 
retirement income of $18,000.00. 
The court in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), held 
a two-year alimony award was an abuse of discretion, based upon the 
facts that the wife was married soon after high school, her primary 
occupation during the twenty-odd year marriage was caring for the 
parties' home and six children, she had only worked at two clerical 
jobs briefly during the marriage, and had no reasonable expectation 
of obtaining employment two years hence that would enable her to 
support herself at a standard of living even approaching that which 
she had during the marriage. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court 
overturned the alimony award to award permanent alimony to the 
wife. 
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In Higley v. Hicrley. 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed a $100.00 per month alimony award, based upon the 
wife's very poor health, the fact that she had spent thirty years 
as a homemaker and caretaker of five children, her efforts as a 
homemaker enabled the husband to build a career as an aircraft 
welder, she had no employment training or experience other than a 
few sporadic, seasonal, unskilled jobs, and due to her health 
problems, it is questionable whether she could maintain a full time 
job. The matter was remanded. 
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) . 
Mrs. Jones was fifty-two years of age at the time of trial. She 
had only performed sporadic, seasonal, and unskilled jobs during 
the marriage, and, with the full consent of her husband, had 
devoted most of her time to rearing the parties' four children. 
She had no professional training, few marketable skills, and no 
independent income. Id. at 1075. The Utah Supreme Court stated, 
in overruling her temporary alimony award and ordering permanent 
alimony, that it is "entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or training will 
be able to enter the job market and support herself in anything 
even resembling the style in which the couple had been living." 
Id. at 1075. See also Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 
1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985); Hicrley v. 
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Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381-82 (Utah 1983); Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P.2d 1331, 1334 (UtahCt. App. 1988); and Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 
P.2d 615, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals held the trial court's alimony award was 
an abuse of discretion in Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) . The Court cited such reasons as the wife's limited 
education, lack of work experience, and the fact that she had no 
reasonable expectation of obtaining employment within two years 
that would be sufficient to enable her to support herself at a 
standard of living even approaching that which she had during the 
marriage. The award of alimony on a temporary basis was overturned 
and the wife was granted permanent alimony. Id. at 74. 
Further, in Gardner v. Gardner,748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the alimony award, specifically listing 
the fact that although the wife had been employed as an executive 
secretary while her husband was in medical school, she had not been 
employed for a period of thirty years and therefore would have a 
very difficult time finding employment. Id. at 1081. 
Within her brief, Wife stated as follows: 
On the surface, the factual situation in the present case 
would appear to be the reverse of the common situation 
where the husband earns a professional degree and the 
wife works to support the family, contributes to a 
husband's education costs, provides a home, accepts a 
lower standard of living, a depletion of their marital 
assets, and may even forego her own education or career 
opportunities, all with the intention that their joint 
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efforts will be rewarded by the husband's increased 
earning capacity and a better and higher standard of 
living when the degree is earned. Then, at the threshold 
of this increased earning power, the parties divorce. 
The marital earnings and savings were used to support the 
family and to meet the husband's educational expenses, 
resulting in virtually no property subject to equitable 
distribution. 
(Appellant's Brief at 21). This case is almost exactly the 
situation described by Wife, above. First, Wife earned a 
professional degree during the marriage and is now a medical 
doctor. When the parties were first married Wife either worked as 
a secretary or not at all. Second, Husband worked throughout the 
marriage to support the family. Although Husband may not have 
contributed to actual tuition costs (as Wife obtained loans for the 
same), Husband provided the great majority of the income for the 
parties throughout the twenty-one year marriage. Third, Husband 
sacrificed in order to assist Wife in her educational pursuits, 
including using the parties' savings and living apart from the 
family in a small camper trailer while Wife was attending medical 
school and living in a home. Wife was able to have domestic help 
during medical school by taking in a boarder in the home for which 
Husband paid the mortgage. He travelled hundreds of miles each 
week in order to be near the family. He moved from a union state 
(Arizona) to a non-union state (Utah) in order to be with the 
family while Wife completed her residency requirements. He could 
not find work as a result. He provided homemaking services for a 
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period of three years while the parties' two minor children were 
teenagers. Fourth, in the last year of marriage the parties' 
income, as a result of Wife's completion of her education, 
drastically increased to $100,000 per year and is expected to 
continue at the same amount or to continue to increase. However, 
Husband's earning ability has decreased during the marriage as a 
result of supporting Wife's education and moving with the family in 
pursuit of Wife's career. At best, his income is static. 
Thus, this is clearly a case in which Husband's efforts and 
sacrifices helped to relieve Wife's burden of supporting herself 
and the children and allowed Wife to devote most of her time and 
attention to her education. 
The Utah Legislature has specifically provided for alimony 
awards in situations such as this case. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on 
the threshold of a major change in the income of one of 
the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If 
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, 
the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing 
the marital property and awarding alimony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (e) (Supp. 1996) . 
The language of this statute was based upon the decision in 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991), which states 
as follows: 
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When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change, unless unrelated to the efforts put forward by 
the spouses during the marriage, should be given some 
weight in fashioning the support award [citation 
omitted]. Thus, if one spouse's earning has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouse during the 
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony. 
The trial court entered specific findings which supported the 
award of alimony based upon the specific facts and circumstances of 
these parties and equitable theories of marriage as a partnership. 
I think that to characterize that situation as though the 
plaintiff was the only one that contributed to her being 
able to go through the school and to accomplish the 
things that she did is not an accurate statement. The 
court believes that both parties contributed 
significantly to their family life, such as it was during 
those years that the plaintiff was going to school. 
(Tr. at 222). 
During the course of the parties' marriage, they worked 
to the common good of the family unit. . . . [T]his court 
could not characterize this situation as plaintiff having 
been the only one to put herself through medical school. 
Both parties contributed significantly and substantially 
to plaintiff's attendance at medical school. 
(Findings of Fact #13 (e); R. at 99-100). 
The court is unable to value one parties' labor more than 
the others. 
(Findings of Fact #13(g); R. at 100). 
The standard of living enjoyed by the parties during 
their marriage does not approach the standard of living 
which can be enjoyed by the plaintiff now, based upon her 
income. On the other hand, during the time the parties 
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lived together as husband and wife, the defendant 
contributed in part to achieving plaintiff's current 
financial situation. 
(Findings of Fact #13(n); R. at 102). 
Wife has also cited the above findings, but does so for the 
proposition that the findings imply that the trial court was making 
a compensation award to Husband. (Appellant's Brief at 32). In a 
general sense, alimony itself may be seen as a compensating award. 
However, the trial court, as evidenced by the findings cited above, 
was setting forth its exact findings explaining how and why the 
court entered the alimony award that the Wife claims the court did 
not enter. The alimony award in this matter is based upon the 
partnership theory of marriage and the findings cited above relate 
that theory specifically to the facts of this case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the very idea of 
marriage contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice. Yet, in 
this case, [the wife] would value only her contribution to the 
marriage and not his." Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P. 2d at 541. 
This is exactly the position that Wife has taken in this matter, 
and it is exactly this type of position that the partnership theory 
of marriage, and the Utah Supreme Court in following this theory, 
have disallowed. 
Therefore, the trial court properly determined that this was 
an appropriate case for an alimony award and set forth sufficient 
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findings upon which to base the award. The trial court determined 
that, inasmuch as Husband had supported and assisted Wife 
throughout the twenty-one year marriage, the proper period of time 
for alimony in this matter was twenty-one years. The findings of 
fact, and the facts before the court below upon which the findings 
were based, provide sufficient basis for the lower court's 
determination of the amount and duration of the award. 
II. COMPENSATION ADJUSTMENTS IN MARITAL PROPERTY AND 
ALIMONY AWARDS SHOULD REMAIN BASED ON EQUITABLE 
PRINCIPLES, SUBJECT TO THE INDIVIDUAL FACTS OF EACH CASE. 
Wife alleges in her brief that the new Utah alimony statute 
and prior case law provide no guidelines for the trial courts as to 
how to make compensation adjustments in alimony awards in cases 
such as this. However, Utah courts and the Utah Legislature have 
consistently and specifically refrained from requiring strict 
guidelines in marital property distribution and alimony awards, and 
have rather relied on equitable principles. In fact, the Utah 
alimony statute provides just such equitable guidelines in 
compensation cases such as that described by Plaintiff. 
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard 
of living, existing at the time of separation, in 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the 
time of trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (c) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added) . 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the parties' standard 
of living is ""fact-sensitive" and . . . the court must consider 
"all relevant facts and equitable principles" [and therefore the 
appellate court should] defer to the court's sound discretion in 
determining the parties' standard of living." Hoagland v. 
Hoagland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Howell 
v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Further, the cases from other jurisdictions which Wife cites 
for her proposition that specific guidelines should be set forth do 
not support her argument. First, Wife cites St.-Pierre v. St.-
Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984) (holding that the husband was 
not entitled to an alimony award from a wife who had received 
medical degree because husband could support himself). The fact 
situation in that case is dissimilar to that in the case at hand. 
Further, as quoted by Wife in her brief, with regard to strict 
guidelines, the South Dakota court specifically held as follows: 
We do not propose that the trial court be bound by any 
specific formula or approach in determining the amount of 
such alimony. Just as the trial court is not bound by 
any mathematical formula in dividing marital property, 
neither should the trial court be bound by a rigid 
inflexible formula in awarding reimbursement or 
rehabilitative alimony. Rather, the trial court should 
consider all relevant factors including the amount of the 
supporting spouse's contributions, his or her foregoing 
opportunities to enhance or improve professional or 
vocational skills, and the duration of the marriage 
following completion of the non-supporting spouse's 
professional education. 
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Id. at 2 62. Thus, the South Dakota court has endorsed the 
equitable standard, based upon the specific circumstances of the 
parties in each individual case, which Husband advocates and which 
is currently the law in the state of Utah. 
Wife has cited cases from other jurisdictions in which the 
professional spouse was not ordered to provide alimony. However, 
none of these cases advance her argument that specific guidelines 
should be set forth, and the fact situations in each of these cases 
are different from that of the parties in this case. For example, 
the court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (N.J. 1982) 
stated that reimbursement alimony should not subvert the basic 
goals of traditional alimony and equitable distribution. The 
Arizona court in Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 681 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) looked to the "individual personalities" of the parties and 
refused to look to the husband and wife as "economic entities". 
Id. at 207. That court held a trial court is required to make 
specific findings regarding the facts of the individual cases. Id. 
Therefore, the Utah courts as well as courts in other 
jurisdictions support the principle that alimony awards, whether 
based upon compensating factors or not, must be based on equitable 
principles and conform to the individual facts of each case. The 
trial court in this matter did so. Accordingly, Wife's argument 
for the establishment of specific guidelines must fail. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EQUALIZE THE 
PARTIES7 RESPECTIVE INCOME LEVELS IN THIS MATTER. 
The fact situation in this matter is such that the trial court 
should have equalized the parties' respective income levels through 
the alimony award. The trial court awarded alimony to Husband in 
the amount of $1,700.00 per month for a period of twenty-one years. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law #13(p), Decree of Divorce 
#11, Tr. 58) . However, in marriages of long duration, equalization 
of the parties' income levels is proper. 
The Utah alimony statute states that "the court may, under 
appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(7) (d) (Supp. 1996) . 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the need to allow 
equalization of income with alimony awards and the circumstances 
surrounding such awards. 
Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in light of 
the standard of living they had during marriage. Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones, 700 
P. 2d at 1075. In some circumstances, it may be 
appropriate to try to equalize the spouses' respective 
standards of living. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081; see also 
Olson v.Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); Hialey v. 
Hialey, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
The fact situation in this matter is precisely the type of 
situation described in Martinez. Thus, equalization of income in 
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this case is proper. During the course of this marriage Wife 
attended college and medical school as well as completed her 
residency. Although Wife obtained student loans to assist her with 
tuition and books, the substantial majority of Wife's living 
expenses (excluding approximately $6,000 per year) was provided by 
Husband. Husband was required to live apart from Wife and the 
parties' children while Wife was in medical school in order to 
continue working at a job which provided the income needed to 
support the family. After Wife and the children moved to a 
different city while Wife attended medical school, Husband lived in 
a camper trailer in his parent's yard. Husband supported the 
family with his earnings and they were able to live in a two-
bedroom home and Wife was even able to have a live-in nanny to 
assist with the children on the weekdays (while Husband was out of 
town working) . Later, when Wife was serving her residency, the 
family moved to Utah. Husband quit his union job in Arizona to 
move with the family. Then, after Wife was able to support the 
family on her substantial income, the parties agreed that Husband 
would remain at home with the parties' minor children, who were 
teenagers at the time. Husband stayed at home and raised the 
children for three years prior to the parties' separation. 
This is clearly a case in which Husband's efforts and 
sacrifices helped to relieve Wife's burden of supporting herself 
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and the children and allowed Wife to devote most of her time and 
attention to her education. 
Further, Wife's income and expenses are such that she has the 
ability to equalize the parties' income through alimony. Wife 
earns a net income of $7,664.69 per month. Her expenses are 
$4,104.00 a month. Thus, Wife has $3,561.00 per month excess 
income. This calculation even allows for expenses such as the 
following: a building lot in Willard at $734.00 per month; clothing 
at $250.00 per month; insurance for adult children; financing an 
adult child's college or university education; entertainment at 
$300.00 per month; pet care of $200.00 per month; vacation 
allowance of $100.00 per month; $200.00 a month gift allowance, and 
$75.00 per month for dentist expenses. Therefore, while Wife has 
the ability to expend great sums for luxuries such as those listed 
above and still has excess income of over $3,500.00 per month, her 
Husband of 21 years is still living in a camp trailer and can't 
muster first and last month's rent to get into an apartment. (Tr. 
at 198-99) . 
Accordingly, this is a proper case for the equalization of 
income. This court should therefore remand this case for a factual 
determination of the monetary amount needed to equalize the 
parties' income levels. 
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IV. HUSBAND SHOULD BE REIMBURSED FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED IN THIS ACTION. 
At trial, Husband's counsel proffered that her attorney's fees 
and costs were approximately $3,000.00. The trial court awarded 
Husband attorney's fees in the amount of $1,000.00. It is 
equitable that Husband should have been awarded judgment against 
Wife for the full amount. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3, (1953, as amended) states that " [t]he 
district court has discretion to order either party to pay the 
other party's attorney fees in a divorce action." See also, Muir 
v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), citing Mauahan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 145, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
When awarding attorney's fees, "the trial court must find (1) 
the requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the 
requested fees are reasonable; and (3) the other spouse has the 
ability to pay". Muir, at 741, citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 
836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 
425 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
In this matter, Husband is undoubtedly in need of financial 
assistance. Wife is in a much better financial position to pay 
Husband's attorney's fees and has the ability to do so, even if the 
same must be done on a payment rather than lump-sum basis. 
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Additionally, the requested fees were reasonable. In Muir, 
this Court stated as follows: 
In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the 
court may consider the difficulty of the litigation, the 
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, 
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services/ the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the 
attorneys involved." 
Muir, at 741, quoting Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P. 2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1985)) . 
This was a complex case involving research, discovery and 
expertise. Difficult legal issues were broached regarding alimony 
awards. Eacft of the attorneys involved efficiently represented 
their respective clients. Husband prevailed in his claim for 
alimony over Wife's utter objection to paying any alimony. 
Further, the number of hours claimed were reasonable in light 
of the complexity of the case. Husband's attorney has fifteen 
years of experience and expertise in domestic matters, thereby 
warranting the hourly rate charged. Husband's attorney's fees were 
similar to that which would be charged by other similarly skilled 
attorneys practicing in Utah. 
In a similar fact situation, the court in Muir v.Muir, 841 
P.2d 736, 741 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) allowed wife's attorney to 
proffer testimony regarding the amount and reasonableness of 
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attorney's fees. Husband's attorney did not object. The court 
found that wife incurred $15,000.00 in legal fees, but ordered 
husband to only pay $3,000.00 of those fees. The trial court 
offered no explanation for the reduction. Although the court had 
made general findings regarding husband's income, it made no 
findings specifically regarding husband's ability to pay wife's 
attorney's fees. The court held that because the proffered 
evidence of wife's attorney fees was adequate and entirely 
undisputed, the court abused its discretion in reducing the 
requested amount from a sum of more than $15,000 to only $3,000 
without a finding that the reduction was warranted by one of the 
established factors. 
"Where 'the evidence supporting the reasonableness of 
requested attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed, 
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the 
amount requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more 
of the established factors." Muir, at 741, quoting Martindale v. 
Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Husband's attorney's fees were proffered on the record at the 
time of trial and were not objected to. Such fees, as discussed 
above, were proper and undisputed. Each of the factors for 
establishing a reasonable award of attorney's fees were met. 
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Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only 
$1,000 in attorney's fees when the amount requested was $3,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
First, the trial court in this matter did not err in its 
decision to award alimony to Husband nor in the entry of the 
findings or determination of the supporting facts in support of 
that decision. Second, this court should not attempt to alter 
settled law to require specific guidelines for establishing 
compensation alimony. The sound principles of equity and the 
totality of the circumstances in each case should govern all 
alimony decisions and therefore this court should not alter the 
law. Third, the trial court erred in failing to equalize the 
parties' income through the alimony award in light of the length of 
the parties' marriage and the circumstances surrounding Wife's 
ability to earn a greater income due to her medical degree. 
Fourth, the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees, as 
Husband should have been awarded the entire amount of $3,000 as 
requested. Finally, Husband should receive his fees incurred in 
this appeal. 
Thus, this court should affirm the lower court's decision in 
part and reverse the lower court's decision in part, as outlined 
above. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1996. 
CORPORON 8c WILLIAMS, P.C. 
MARY C £t>RPORON ' / / ~ < 7 " ^ ^ 7 ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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